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Judgements of performance art are often contingent upon a notion of Authenticity. What
we mean by authentic, however, is not readily accessible. An exploration of proposed 
authenticity-theories can help reveal the merits and impediments contained within those
theories--and may ultimately suggest an Authentic-metric. However, such an analysis
leads, counterintuitively, to the jeopardization of the term. We can suggest, in virtue of 
our analysis, that formal inconsistencies within the Authentic-metric promote a more
elusive aesthetic discourse than otherwise necessary. By endorsing direct aesthetic
discourse we can remove the obscured lens of Authenticity and begin encountering works













Many people believe that for a non-improvised performance piece of music to be good, it
must be authentic. Deservedly or not, the results of this value based litmus test dominate
the overall aesthetic evaluation of a given performance. Authenticity brings with it high 
aesthetic quality whereas performances that are not authentic will automatically have low,
or at least lower, aesthetic quality. The employment of such an aesthetic paradigm is a
pragmatic and commonsensical method of artistic appraisal. However, in order to initiate
this aesthetic school of thought we must first determine how to define authenticity and 
how we ought to apply it in practice. Existing theories of the Authenticity of performance
show us composer, musicians, instruments, and score as being the primary determinants
of a work’s aesthetic and authentic success. If our theory cannot be justified within these
parameters then we may suggest a subversive motivation on the part of authenticity 
theorists as, presumably, an aesthetic theory cannot be made out of a theory unconcerned 
with aesthetics. Modern musicologists have proposed two paradigms of authenticity-
theory which focus on the intentions of composers and performers. Both theories
demonstrate debilitating frailties when compared to one which posits that the authentic
performance is the one which takes the work at face value as presented through score, 
instructive asides from the composer, and traditional interpretation. Examining this third 
“documentary theory of authenticity,”also fails, thus we are left with only the translated 
prejudices of consumers. When we posit that a work either obtains or fails to achieve a
state of authenticity we are, more than anything else, obfuscating a preferred aesthetic

















The “auditorium-chair philosopher” is easily tempted to question the way in 
which a performance might vary were its composer currently alive. We arrive at this
exploratory assertion if not only due to empirical evidence, but also due to the fact that
unlike other fields of artistic expression music has been historically willing to adopt new
technologies. The piano and the saxophone--in non-classical circles the influx of digital
and electronic instruments--demonstrate this characterization. That in mind,  a question 
along the lines of “what would Bach do with access to a modern orchestra?”-- as well as
the more sweeping “what would Bach do with modern instruments?”-- seem to be
poignant introspections in the mind of the audience member as well as the performer. If 
Authenticity is supposed to exemplify the intentions of a composer it is worth asking:
would his compositional style have changed had he had access to a modern 88 key piano?
Likewise, what would his string arrangements have sounded like had the craftsmen of the
time been able to produce steel, as opposed to gut, strings?
To presuppose that Bach’s orchestral works would remain unchanged despite the
availability of different technology would be tantamount to assuming that Thales, 5th c. 
b.c. cosmological conviction--“All is wet,” would not change were he to have been 
learned in the modern sciences. When one assumes that composers and their works would
be unchanged given access to a different field of technology, one quietly posits the that
composers somehow supersede their own historical context. Were roughly 250 years of 
technological and musicological advancement available to him, it seems implausible that
Bach’s works would be utterly unaffected. I feel confident that a contemporary Bach, 












construct his works with some semblance to contemporary fashion. This ‘blasphemous’
opinion may abhor traditionalist musicologists; still it seems imaginable that a modern 
Bach--or a Bach-with-modern-orchestra--might toy with the timbres of technology, 
perhaps abandoning pipe-organ for something else, be it a synthesizer or modern 
symphonic orchestra. Abandoning what we might call our most creative interpretations
(xaguilar79) the theory that time and technology determine composition still holds strong.
Even when we explore the lesser formulation of this theory (above mentioned as Bach-
with-modern-orchestra) the disparity between what was possible during the time of 
composition and what is possible with access to any given philharmonic group affirms
our suspicion that change would be likely.
 It seems nearly tautological to claim that what an artist produces is itself a
product of the materials available to the artist. Yet, what makes a work of art is, indeed at
least in part, contingent upon what materials are available to the artist. Were it possible to
change the materials available to an artist, one would likely change the product of that
artist. Accordingly, if Bach were to be composing in the modern era then an authentic
performance of Bach could possibly include modern instrumentation. If such a strong 
response can be given to the skeptics of our what-would-Bach-do? paradigm, it only 
seems natural to question what could possibly hinder this authenticity-theory? The
foremost and easiest objection is the simple assertion that we do not, and could not ever, 
know exactly what an individual would have composed under any situation other than 
that situation endured by the composer during his or her lifetime.  Our aforementioned 
















formulation that we can reasonably conjecture. When we choose to explore the
interrogative of the “modern composer”--asking “what would Bach do”-- we are, in fact
exploring ourselves. We are so tempted to consider what a composer might do in a
modern context because if we can succeed in convincing our audience of the authenticity 
of our interpretation then our interpretation is justified. 
The failure to know exactly, “what would Bach do?” might give rise to another 
question in the mind of the performer: “what did Bach do?” Philosopher Aaron Edidin 
notes the rise of“historical authenticity” (Edidin 79) as a functional solution to our 
problem. Edidin opens his discussion, “Playing Bach His Way: Historical Authenticity, 
Personal Authenticity and the Performance of Classical Music” by describing the climate
of classical performance, and subsequently the application of historical authenticity, 
among modern groups: “Performances on archaic instruments...constitute an appreciable
proportion of top-level performances of baroque and earlier music and a nonnegligible
fraction of performances of later music.” (Edidin 79) This movement, of Historically 
Informed Performance, utilizes what we will term “ideal first performance” to assign 
value to subsequent performances. “Ideal first performance,” here implies the way in 
which a composition would have been played upon its initial instantiation were it to be
executed with technical perfection. We formulate our definition in such a way as to have
the authentic performance depend on the specific time period of its composition while
preventing mistakes made by musician or conductor from becoming ossified, 
emblazoned, and certified as authentic. In determining a work’s authenticity our reference












Performances of Bach’s “Toccata and Fugue in D minor” are to be evaluated 
based upon their likeness in execution to the way in which Bach was relegated to 
performing them. Historical authenticity prescribes that period instruments, strings, bows,
techniques, and styles be used in order to accomplish a truly authentic performance. 
These techniques and styles are discovered by lengthy and scrupulous studies in 
musicology. This musicological archaeology attempts to construct what the hypothesized 
“recording of Bach” (Kivy 48) might have sounded like. Were modern aesthetes
presented with this imagined recording, thinks Rutgers professor Peter Kivy 
[It would be possible to]measure any present-day performance against it to 
determine, in this particular sense of ‘authenticity,’ whether that performance was
historically ‘authentic’ or not, or in what degree, by listening to the [modern 
performance]...and the recording of Bach, and comparing them...A present-day 
performance of a Bach fugue, then, is sonically authentic if it is sonically identical
with a performance that Bach might have given. (Kivy 48) 
Much of the classical music which has been recorded, printed, packaged and set for sale
utilizes this “particular sense of ‘authenticity.’” Columbia’s line of Materworks
Recordings champions, E. Power Biggs’ performance of Bach due to the locale of its
performance: the Thomaskirche in Leipzig (Bach’s own church). They continue to 
emphasize the importance of the acoustics of the room as captured in the recording 
(Biggs). We might feel a natural inclination to regard Biggs’ performance as having an 
authenticity greater than an equally well performed version on piano in a local auditorium

















taking place in the same location as Bach’s would have gives it greater worth: perhaps
even with good reason. Performing on a similarly attuned instrument in the same room
that Bach himself composed, Biggs’ performance makes every effort to conform to the
ideal first performance and produces an aesthetically impressive work. 
Despite the conformity of our notion of “greater worth” in Biggs’ performance
and the ideal first performance, we still encounter practical issues when we endorse this
theory over others. When we support the notion that the ideal first performance is the
authentic, or correct, version we necessarily generate a limit case in which all subsequent
performances fail to truly achieve a state of authenticity. The ideal first performance sets
a standard which cannot be achieved. The conditions of that imagined instantiation are
necessarily removed from contemporary performers and necessarily inaccessible. The
ideal first performance is couched in history and subsequently locale, attendance, style of 
dress, date, politics; not to mention instrument specifics. When we support such a
formulation of authenticity we underhandedly assert the existence of an ideal which can 
only be approximated in contemporary performance, and never actually realized. Surely 
this is too strong a requirement for music written and clearly intended to be played long 
into the future. 
Even weaker version of the “ideal first performance” still appears erroneous. 
Instead of utilizing “ideal first performance” as our metric, let us instead use the one
which (in Edidin’s phrase), “[realizes] the composers intentions and expectations
regarding style.” Such a position maintains a commitment to the technical specifics of the
period--instruments, style of play--while dropping the unreasonably specific
10 












metaphysical definition. A brief exploration of this new theory reveals that we are no 
longer talking about Authenticity as an aesthetic virtue in its own right, but are instead 
discoursing about the historicity of a piece. 
If we consider a performance to be Authentic based upon its resemblance to a
specific incarnation of the piece in a historical time period, then we are diminishing the
importance of the Authentic and forcing it to be accompanied by a qualifier. 
“Authenticity” no longer stands on its own but must be accompanied by “Historical.”
When we do this, however we equivocate “Historical authenticity” with “historical
accuracy.” All analysis of a performance’s resemblance to an historically imagined 
performance is done outside of the work itself. And while there may be merit for 
discussing a piece based upon its recapitulation of a historical time period, it also seems
foolish to allow accuracy (something outside of the work) to assign aesthetic success  or 
failure (something within the work) to a work. Furthermore, if performers rely upon 
musicologists for their direction in performance--which style to play in, which 
instruments to use, which frequency to tune to--what would happen to all of the
performances deemed “Authentic” were musicologists discover an error in their field of 
study? It is currently held by many musicologists that in the Baroque era the frequency of
A was not 440 hertz, as is standard today, but instead was nearly a half step lower. If 
these same musicologists were to discover that, in fact, the frequency of A had never 
changed would all of the performances of the late twentieth century become
retrospectively inauthentic? Would the “excellent” performances of today suddenly be
deemed inauthentic because of this misinformation? It is awfully counterintuitive that
11 










aesthetic quality could change in this way. It seems that the Authentic performance may 
well be related to historical performance, but authenticity is surely not fully encapsulated 
by details of history. 
What are we left with if even the historical setting of a piece fails to engross the
definition of Authentic? The notes, scores, and documented remarks of the composer. 
Arguing against the historical notion of authenticity Stan Godlovitch draws a comparison 
between score and recipe:
There are known degrees of uncertainty regarding relative proportions of 
ingredients, the strength and quantity of the vinegar, the precise varieties of the
herbs and greens. Such uncertainties prompt empirical inquiry which may 
uncover further evidence about which exploratory hypotheses may be
entertained...we are not tracking down the taste sensation of a fourteenth-century 
salad-eater. The recipe never promises that we can taste what they tasted. It does, 
however, give us good reason to think that we can at least prepare salad much as
they did, and eat what they ate; and so the cook’s-eye view of authenticity. 
(Godlovitch 162) 
What Godlovitch expresses bears resemblance to our historical authenticity model, and 
yet is distinct. “The recipe never promises that we can taste what they tasted” writes
Godlovitch, anticipating the precise error which prevented our endorsement of the “ideal
first performance” model. Instead, authenticity is a commitment to the recipe, with faith 
in the promise that we can “prepare salad much as they did [italics mine].” The authentic


















way that it shows faith to the “recipe.” Strings, styles, costumes, do not necessarily
impinge upon a performance’s ability to garner authenticity. 
Those who are unhappy with this definition may try to denigrate it with claims of 
relativism. Given an audience with unsophisticated taste, an inauthentic performance
could be mistaken for an authentic one much as a poorly prepared recipe may be well
received. To suggest that an authentic performance is the one which shows ‘faith’ in our 
ability to perform “much as they did” is to allow for the inclusion of any number of non-
conventional performance methods. An electronic instrument, for instance, specifically 
calibrated to mimic the timbre of the organ at Bach’s Thomaskirche, could render an 
authentic performance were it to be executed in such a way that it commits itself to the
‘recipe.’
 In the hypothesized event that a performance of Bach were given on a synthesizer 
(smalin)--even if this synthesizer were to be superbly crafted--it would not, in fact, meet
the requirements of the “cooks’s-eye” to earn the title “authentic.” The cook’s-eye view
of authenticity has respect for the recipe. Thus we are able to rule out performances of the
work on the myriad of electronic instruments currently in circulation. That we are “not
tracking down the taste sensation of a fourteenth-century salad-eater” (Godlovitch 162) 
should not be exaggerated to incorporate the relativism suggested in the critique of the
cook’s-eye view of authenticity. Certain ingredients can be substituted without
decimating the general flavor of a dish. Likewise, various components of a performance
may be changed without guaranteeing the piece’s failure to be authentic. Why should we
discount a performance of Bach’s work based solely on its being performed on a newer 
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organ, a piano, or perhaps even with a full orchestra? Certainly his piece was written and 
initially performed on a specific organ in a specific locale, but as we have shown, if we
only adopt history as our metric we can never truly call any performance authentic. 
The flexibility of the “cook’s-eye” as an aesthetic perspective gives one the
opportunity to return from the realm of excessively technical artistic constructs and 
concern ourselves with practical application. The success or failure of our theory depends
upon its ability to successfully account for the aesthetic disparity between authentic and 
inauthentic performances. Having sketched a functional definition of the term, our next
task is to determine which of the aforementioned performances stand up to the Authentic
metric. Which performance of Bach’s Toccata and Fugue in D minor can be said to “give
us good reason to think that we can at least [hear the performance] much as they 
did...” (Godlovitch 162). 
The “cook’s-eye view” is demonstrative of a type of performance paradigm that
philosophers like Peter Kivy have termed “compliance.” In simple terms this notion of 
compliance demands that an authentic work respect the “instructions for performing that
are embodied in the score.” (Kivy, Introduction 225). Compliance-theory predicates this
“respect” as a necessary condition of a performance’s being authentic. In our own 
discussion we can readily encounter this respect in the Columbia Masterworks
performance by Biggs. In addition to its compliance, Biggs’ recording cements itself 
within the “spirit” of the piece in virtue of the locale of his performance. Biggs’ playing, 
it might then be said, is an exemplification or instantiation of the Authentic. But what are






    
 
 







The rendition of Toccata and Fugue in D minor for piano seems a likely second 
place contender for the title: “Authentic”. The masterful and delicate performance by 
Alexander Gavrylyuk, taken from the 2007 Miami International Piano Festival clearly 
attains the power and force of Biggs’ opening throes. Though his instrument, piano, is
incapable of achieving the same range as either Bach or Biggs’ organ, Gavrylyuk 
undeniably executes the transfer to piano with skill. Concessions must be made, however,
if we are to deem his work authentic without argument. Because his performance is for an
instrument which did not exist during Bach’s lifetime a conservative critic can easily 
suggest that Gavrylyuk’s performance is inauthentic. Even according to the conservative
paradigm, though, his tokening of the Toccata seems to at least approach Authenticity:
participating in the same “spirit” as Biggs’ own performance of the work as a
performance of Bach on keyboard. It is this admission--and the hierarchical edifice which
follows it--which will ultimately deconstruct the authentic. 
It is in evaluating the intuitively “lesser” version of the Toccata that Godlovitch’s
cook’s-eye view slides into what I will call the arbitrary and prejudicial gourmet’s-eye
view. Despite our theory’s concurrence with the popular opinion that both our 
synthesized recording of the Toccata and the version performed for electric guitar 
represent mere vulgar or lowly manifestations of Bach’s great work, the fact is that both 
performances bear greater sonic resemblance to the original than Gavrylyuk’s. The
performance given for electric guitar employs varied effects aimed at simulating the
reverberation and timbre of a church’s organ. Furthermore, by the very nature of synthetic
















Toccata than Gavrylyuk of Biggs. Naysayers might debate the artificial nature of a
synthesized performance as being of a different type; that their similarity is a a result of 
the manipulation of an electronic signal and not in virtue of their natural sound. Perhaps
rightly, they suggest that the synthesized performance circumvents some other essential
aspects of performance: that works need to be performed by individuals. With these
critiques in mind our critique of the “cook’s-eye” view can be rewritten to include not
only human performance but also acoustic instrumentation. 
While somewhat humorous, it is foreseeable that even a troupe of kazoo players
could better perform Bach’s piece. The kazoos would need to be crafted in various sizes
in order to account for the range of the piece, but given the right kazoos and enough time
to practice our imagined group could presumably execute the piece with a great level of 
accuracy. While our example is downright foolish, the timbre of an imagined kazoo-
symphony would bear greater sonic similarity to Bach than even a skilled pianist. How
are we to account for this phenomenon?  It appears that a conception of authenticity 
which resists the lowly, but sonically similar, performances of a work must appeal to 
some non-musical aspect of performance. Yet, surely musical authenticity and musical
quality should depend upon musical properties. Cook’s-eye theorists might, in all
fairness, respond to this accusation by saying that the inclusion of any non-conventional
performance method is invalid in virtue of its failure to respect the implied conventions
of the artistic culture of a piece. Analogously: if our authentic chef were to reject the
substitution of a dark leafed romaine for a similarly dark leafed spinach, while endorsing 















motivation had little to do with the authentic repetition of taste or color in a salad. If the
“cook’s-eye” theorist denigrates the kazoo performance, and embraces--or at least
appreciates--the performance for piano then he has abandoned the recipe in favor of 
something else. 
Compliance-theorists, as well as advocates of the “cook’s-eye view” of 
authenticity might respond by saying that the inclusion of any non-conventional
performance method, would be considered invalid in virtue of its failure to respect the
implied conventions of the artistic culture of a piece. The weight behind such an assertion
lies in the notion that only certain instantiations of a piece ought to be given evaluation. 
Because Bach’s composition is so technologically removed from our ‘inferior’ examples
the “cook’s-eye” theorist would suggest that they necessarily eliminate any possibility of 
their being authentic. Accordingly, the synthesized performance of the Toccata and Fugue
in D minor, while sonically similar and respectful of the musical notation comprising the
piece, is inauthentic in virtue of its being a synthesized performance of the Toccata and 
Fugue in D minor.   
The convention of Bach’s performance is arrived at after careful consideration of 
the way in which Bach has been performed until now, thus the rebuttal of the compliance-
theorist depends upon a functioning conception of how the artworld is constructed and 
regulated. Given that conception compliance theory can be said to posit normative modes
of performance. Under this refined definition, performances of Bach’s piece on piano, or 
by orchestra (both of which may have a greater disparity in timbre than those of a
17 












synthesizer) are considered authentic not in virtue of the actual sonic-envelope which 
they produce, but instead as a result of the culture of the artworld. 
While the “cook’s-eye view of authenticity” succeeds at patching the holes of its
predecessors, it does not stand upon its own independently of the paradigms which 
constructed it. If we are wont to accept a performance of Bach’s piece while rejecting 
performances on sonically similar instruments, then our notion of “recipe,” or 
authenticity, necessarily has little to do with the actual sound of a piece. It is awfully 
suspicious for a theory of musical authenticity and quality to ignore the actual sound of a
piece of music. 
Yet, why should compliance theorists, in their search for the performance
authentic, appeal to the collective essence of art producers and purveyors? Institutional
theorist, George Dickie explains this motivation by saying that “Whenever art is created 
there is...an artist who creates it, but an artist always creates for a public of some
sort” (Dickie 219). The artworld proper comprises the multitude of individuals engaged 
in the creation and enjoyment of aesthetic works and does so in order to provide context
for “[the] public to whom [the] art is presented” (Neil 219). By including the public, 
Dickie and other institutional theorists are able to account for the way in which audiences
actually interact with art. The artworld proper comprises the multitude of individuals
engaged in the creation and enjoyment of aesthetic works. In this particular mode the
artworld functions as a seemingly benign micro-economy. As in other economic
structures, however, the relationship between producer and patron is expressly dynamic. 




















bidirectional. In its dialectical production and consumption of art the artworld 
systematically develops rules by which to more effectively govern itself. The artworld 
does this in virtue of its own selective nature: by determining the successes and failures
of particular works and work-types. Genius theory in general can be traced back to the
emphatic endorsements of creator X. 
When the compliance-theorist turns toward the artworld for assistance, they are
appealing to an authoritative figure. Aesthetic philosopher, and artworld member, Roger 
Scruton expresses this appeal by declaring that “The great work has an authority for us: it
stands beyond criticism, a monument to what is possible...They are, to use Matthew
Arnold’s term, the ‘touchstones’ against which we try all lesser works, and towards which
composers look for their paradigms.” (374) What Scruton points out, and what cook’s-
eye theorists hope to capitalize on, is the way in which the artworld establishes normative
judgements. Authentic performance makes its final stand as being that performance
which conforms to the notion of “greatness” or “authenticity” endorsed by the politicking
artworld conglomerate. However, this position willfully turns a blind eye toward the fact
that the artworld is, in fact, the composite of multiply subjective and nuanced 
artworldviews. The problem of endorsing an appeal like Dickie’s to the artworld, in an 
attempt to salvage a definition of authenticity, is that such an appeal subjects itself to the
relativism of public opinion: to the collective artworldview of any given period. In its
greater sense, the artworldview is the particular expression of the popular undercurrents
of the artworld. In the contemporary considerations we find exemplification of the














“hotel art” inherently fails to achieve aesthetic success, and  in discussions of art/folk-art/ 
craft distinctions. An aggregate of artistic peculiarities, the artworldview is not only 
representative of the flux of artistic fashion but also the research done regarding the
contents of the artworld. 
Presently, the belief is held that the A above middle C of Bach’s time existed at a
different, drastically lower, frequency than the standardized 440 hz recognized by modern
composers. Musicologists, as well as art historians, have found sufficient evidence to 
support this  shift--yet, our concern lies apart from determining the sufficiency of 
evidence for an historical topic. However, as participants in the artworld musicologists
themselves display a unique world view in their research and theorizing. In so many 
words, the nature of the musicologist’s interest in a topic can be seen as another product
of a particular artworldview. Those researching the correct pitch of A over middle C were
engaged with their topic as a function of their own culture. Were this not the case, a
discovery like the correct pitch of A above middle C could not exist. No individual could 
correctly assimilate the evidence for the theory of “A over middle C’s variance” without
some motivation on the part of an artworldview. We arrive at this conclusion because it
seems implausible that something non-cultural could compel research in the topic of 
“variance in the pitch of A above middle C” a topic concerned only with culture. 
Moreover, it is worth wondering how the correct pitch could ever have been lost in the
first place without there first being a popular indifference over the correct pitch of A over 














institutional appeal to the artworld because the artworld itself cannot produce an 
objectively valid description of the Authentic 
The fluidity of our comparison and categorization shifts the heretofore absolute
notion of Authenticity to a subjective, or at least popular, conception of the term. When 
we say this we finally discard of the belief that Authenticity exists in the work itself, or as
a system of absolute rules. Arguing for the subjective understanding of the authentic
Allan Moore posits that “'Authenticity is a matter of interpretation which is made and 
fought for from within a cultural and, thus, historicised position. It is ascribed, not
inscribed.” (210) Authenticity under these terms exists within the artworld, is a mode of 
positive “authentication.” When we call Biggs’ performance of Bach ‘authentic’ we are
claiming that it complies with the curated opinion on how Bach ought to be performed, 
not with some special character in the score, or even an identifiable sonic signifier. 
‘Authenticity’ in this respect is, as we have suggested, merely the socially dominant and 
approved method of performance. Distinction of the authenticities between one
performance and another seem to rely only upon an individual’s fluency within the
fabricated artworldview of their day and age. We use the word “fabricated” here not to 
diminish the value of the popular artistic world-view, but instead to indicate the way in 
which the rules of the artworldview only come into being after they have been “made and
fought for from within a cultural and historicised position.” Moore concludes his paper 
by suggesting that a type of authenticity can be preserved by focusing on perceivers and 
what they find or fail to find within a work. I believe that by lingering upon what is
21 














authenticated--what is “found” within a work--we may be able to categorize the habits of 
the perceiver: truly demystifying the nature of the performance authentic. 
When the executives of the Columbia Masterworks series market E. Power Biggs’
recording as being played in the “Bach’s own church” and, even more so, when the
listener is given evidence of the recording’s genuine instrumentation--“the disposition of 
the instrument...is particularly suited to the performance of works from the 16th to the
18th century...”--it is worth wondering what substance truly underlines the work’s
implied authenticity? Clearly these rhetorical techniques attempt to validate and prioritize
Biggs’ recording in the face of competing performances. But, as we have demonstrated, 
“authenticity” cannot be posited as an aesthetic attribute. Instead, the values which lie
behind claims to authenticity can be translated into more direct language. 
The Columbia Masterworks series--apparently invoking the ‘first performance’
theory--seeks to praise not Authenticity, as such, but rather History. Their concern with 
the history of a piece can be seen smuggled into their definition of the Authentic and their
desire to replicate that which the composer could have done as a matter of fact. They rely 
upon the assertion that the “composer knows best” in order to structure their evaluative
system. I do not wish to argue against the belief professed by Edidin, that “there is good 
prima facie reason to expect that following such suggestions will often be a source of 
aesthetic good.” (82) However, it is imperative that we highlight the way in which 
Edidin’s discussion takes place.  Edidin’s paradigm appeals to specific qualities of a work
and assigns those qualities values. Basing it on an alleged “authenticity” obscures the












historical quality of a work is functional in common conversation, but invoking the
Authentic in academic discussions is superfluous. No explanatory power is delivered to 
composers, performers or audiences by laying claim to the Authentic. Instead, they only 
transmute the arguable and finite terms of discussion to the enigmatic terms of aesthetic
attribution.  
In fact, Godlovitch’s near success extolling the virtues of the “cook’s-eye” view
of Authenticity provides evidence for our claim against the enigmatic Authentic. We
arrive at this conclusion when we consider that terms of the “cook’s-eye” view generates
only a few necessary conditions by which to determine if a work is authentic or not. In 
accordance with his analogy the salad constructed by the authentic chef need only give us
“good reason” to think that we can “eat what they ate.” By avoiding absolute terms of 
sufficiency--prescribing exactly which proportions of greens and vinaigrettes result in an 
inarguably authentic salad--Godlovitch constructs an approach to the authentic which 
denigrates “thinness” (172) in favor of empirically rich language. The “thin” appraisal, to 
Godlovitch, paints a broad picture which cannot be verified except subjectively: “Thin 
concepts like ‘good’ are relatively empty empirically.” These “thin” evaluations are
endlessly debatable. What this means in terms of his argument--as well as our own, to 
some degree--is that performances of works cannot  be properly analyzed with the
question “How ought this to be performed?” Where our two analyses diverge, however is
in our reformulation of the question: “Which performance is preferred, and why.”
 It is with this question that we come to the true essence of Authenticity:
preference. When we posit that a work either obtains or fails to achieve a state of 
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authenticity we are, more than anything else, obfuscating a preferred aesthetic quality and
masquerading it as an aesthetic attribute. Theories regarding the tension between our 
nominal definition of Authenticity and the absolute or universal notion of the Authentic
have been in circulation since the beginning of the 20th century. Writing in the early 
1900’s Dr. C. Hubert H. Parry notes in respect to the perceived authenticity of a work that 
...unfortunately it is not in the least degree probable that any such simple and 
universal touchstones of quality will be found. All the people who think they have
found them prove worse than useless, and merely cumber the road of artistic
progress. When they think they have found tests to prevent being imposed upon 
they make them into formulas, and then they set up their formulas as fetishes, and 
the fetishes, after their kind, invariably cease to be intelligible to them...the
standards change from day to day; new spheres of artistic energy are discovered;
and in the bewilderment induced by its chameleon-like properties men fail even to
recognize their own tests when they are staring them full in the face. (377) 
And while these preferred aesthetic qualities may exist only within the popular 
artworldview of a time, they exist nonetheless. This fluid understanding of what is meant
by authenticity as presented by Parry, and endorsed in this paper, amounts to the fact that
aesthetics may pragmatically appeal to the notion of “authenticity” but that the word 
itself is only a sign referring to a dense cultural paradigm indicative of individual
preferences. 
When we translate our usage of the term, Authenticity, in respect to a performance















categorical approval or disapproval of the work, but also a specific incentive for that
judgement. When theorists like Edidin, Godlovitch or Moore take it upon themselves to 
promote refinements on the definition of the Authentic they begin and conclude their 
arguments at the same point of preference. Instead of arguing within the confines of 
limited preferences, though, these theorists argue their for personal preferences to a point
of total abstraction. Careful analysis can show the ways in which claims to performance
authenticity may be reduced and translated into claims of preference. 
If we return to the inquiry made by our imagined auditorium chair philosopher, 
she questions “what would Bach do with a modern orchestra?” if not only out of sheer 
entertainment but also because she finds merit in constructing his own intuition of the
performance. Likewise, When another individual praises a performance of Bach for 
closely representing the accepted musicological version of his work they are asserting 
that what is important to them is the resemblance of performance to such a musicological
standard because they believe such resemblance brings with it aesthetic value. 
Let us take for example the devotee of the ideal first performance. When this
individual praises a performance of Bach for closely representing the accepted 
musicological version of his work they are asserting that what is important to them is the
resemblance of performance to such a musicological standard. As we have shown, this
preference of original over representation finds worth not in the performance itself but
instead instead in what we might call “...the historical value placed upon [Bach] in his
[Leipzig] context.” (Brook) Thus it is in their experience of the work they must be














believe that such a resemblance will bring with it aesthetic value. They reject
performance of Bach on piano, guitar, synthesizer, kazoo under the pretext that either i) 
those instruments did not exist at the time, or ii) Bach did not write music to be
performed upon those instruments. Their statement of preference, “x is an authentic
performance,” can be translated to better describe where they believe the aesthetic value
of a performance lies. 
Many will complain that such a  against our translative theory with non-absolute
expressions of authenticity theory will descend into mere aesthetic relativism. Their line
of thought proceeds: if we are to reduce or translate expressions of performance authentic
into statements of preference we will also eliminate our ability to discuss that which 
makes the satisfactory stand apart from the great. An even more hearty objection to this
method of translation concedes our theory but renders it impotent. Authenticity is an 
expression of a preference based in a particular artworldview, they admit, but the mere
fact that it expresses preference--and not some metaphysical attribute of a performance--
does not strip it of its semantic meaning. So what? they say: our conversations still make
sense when we use the term. 
The first objection is, perhaps, best dealt with by another question: why does one
prefer what she prefers? The difference between the satisfactory and the great
performance does not vanish in the wake of our deconstruction of the Authentic any more
so than the reasons that we have for preferring the great to the satisfactory. That is to say, 
reasons for preferring one piece to another--valid, communicable, and tangible reasons--















justify her preference then it seems imperative that she pay closer attention. Why should 
the audience member prefer E. Power Biggs’ performance of the Toccata and Fugue in D
minor to the hullabaloo of a kazoo troupe? As an audience we could present valid 
arguments for our preference: the texture of the performance, or the skill of Biggs and his
study of the piece. When we translate the Authentic into a statement of preference we
simply make clear the real and specific bases of evaluation, and eliminate the enigmatic
element of our discussion. No explanatory power is lost with our translation. If anything, 
it is gained. 
“Authenticity,” as a term used to communicate an opinion of aesthetic experience, 
can still accomplish this task even given our analysis. The layman attending a
performance of classical music may still question his neighbors as to the piece’s
authenticity. And in their response, his neighbors, may still affirm or deny that
“authenticity” based upon their own artworldview; as if that title were akin to the truth 
value of a logical proposition. In the realm of Aesthetics, however, it is imperative that
we recognize the hollow and inconsistent nature of “authenticity.” While still a plausible
adjective within common language, it has been shown to be fraught with inconsistencies. 
In the realm of physics we could not allow that the idea of the sun “moving across the
sky,” while linguistically valid, constitutes some sort of proof of the static earth theory. 
When we abandon the archaic conception of the performance authentic and embrace, in 
its place, the constituents of preference aesthetic discussion enters a new field of 
conversation. We ought to discuss the factors which make a work “moving” or 
“repulsive” and not trust in the intentionally obscure notion of our abstraction. By coming
27 
 to terms with the reasons why we prefer or reject performance we can better express the
value of those performances and arrive at a new aesthetic. 
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